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The object of this thesis is to show that according
to the weight of authority and upon principle the
followiRn,- proposition is true :
ONE W IO KNOW'11GLY ITLDUCE1 ONE PARTY TO A VALID
CO"TTRACT TO CO'rIT A BTREACH OF THE CONTRXC(? 19 LIABLE
TO THE OTHER PARTY TO SUC77 CONTRACT FOR THE ACTUAL DAM-
AGES OF WMIC71 79Ig ACT IS THE PROXIMALE CAUSE.
CHAPTER I.
IT0TRODUCTION.
The infrequency with which this question has come
before the courts to be rtviewed and dctermined is
surprising, for the question is not s(;ttled, but is an
open one, and a seemingly close one. A glunce at how
irreconcilable are the results reached in the few
reported cases will show this. One finds not only that
the highest courts differ one from another, but in some
of the cases very able dissenting opinions. This fact
makes the subject teem with interest to the student
of law. lie turns to the text-book#, hoping to find
them guides to lead him through this uncertain field,
but in vain, for it is curious to note the manner in
which their authors have treated the question,
dismissing it with a word. Have the:- considered it of
little interest, reachinr their conclusion, as is too
often the case in this day and generation, by using
the amount of litigation it has caused as the test ;
or, are they loath to attempt to elucidate an entangled
subject ? Be this as it may, we consider the
question of sufficient interest to repay our careful
study.
The subject is important on account of the
additional remedy afforded by allowing an action against
the party causinf-; the breach and t-e protective tendency
of the same. The measuru of' damages for breach of con-
tract is sometimes inadequate. Tak(,for example,
the case of a contract to pay a certain sum of money
on a certain day. The failure so to do may mean
bankruptcy, financial ruin, yet the measure of dam-
ages is limited to the interest on the money from the
day it should have been paid to the day of the judgment,
other damages being too remote. If in this case
the breach was caused solely by the act of a third
party, should he not be responsible for the damages
caused by his act ? Again, it often happens that the
one breaking the contract is irresponsible, and an
action against him would result in an uncollectible
judgment. At the same time, the inducing party may be
a wealthy individual who is reaping revenge in this
indirect way, or the prime mover may be a responsible
labor union, wishing by such means to force certain
persons to join its ranks, or to compel some employer
to submit to its rules. In such cases are wu to say
that courts of justice must stand by and see the indi-
vidual reap revenge, the union compel submission to
its mandates, or deal out destruction as the alterna-
tive ? Are the courts when appealed to for protection
to be compelled to admit that they are powerless to
grant relief ?
A glazce at the labor situation of our country
will show that the question is daily growing more prac-
tical. The keynote of former ages was universality,
oreadth; the watch word of the 19th century is spec-
ialization, depth. This is shown not only in the
field of intellectual pursuits, but in the scientific
and mechanical occupations as well. In the words of
thG political economist Division of Labor is the command.
The widespread effect of this system is not apparent
to the casual observer. Yet, when one remembers
that it requires more capital to conduct a business
in which such a system is in vogue, although in the
end the cost of production is less, corporations
are at once suggested. Corporations call to mind com-
petition between them and the individual, which is fol-
lowed by the individual, after an unsuccessful attempt
to cope with this powerful rival, 7ivin - up the fight
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and accepting employment at the hand of the corporation.
To be freed from competing with his fellow workmen
for !.hose coveted positions and also to be relieved
from oppression by the corporationthe laborer turned to
nature for advice. As usual, she was rOt wanting in
object lessons, and he learned from her that in
union is strength. The result of this observation
was communicated in every direction, and men of every
profession and trade hurried to form themselvs into
unions, ostensibly for their mutual protection and
advancement. Individuality has been, union now is.
The power of some of these unions is almost
disastrous to the labor and commercial interests of our
country. In many cases the officers of such an
organization dictate which men shall be employed in cer-
tain businesses, and which men shall be discharged.
They are aided in this kingly prerogative by the system
of division of labor, for such a system is accompanied
by the disadvantage of the dopendency of one class of
workmen upon another. Watch the working of any large
manufaoturint establishment, and you see that if the
employees in any department cease to work those employ-
ed in every department, dependent upon the inoperative
one for material must also stop. While in the past
individuals may have been prevented by a sense of
Justicc from interfein : with the contracts of others,
in this day of corporations and laoor unions we may
expect a change, looking for this to be a fruitful
source of litigationi. This is especially true since the
unions carry their plans into execution by calling
out their members. 'his causo them to break contracts,
and in manr cases, this is followed by other contracts
being broken.
We have refurred to these mritters in a summary
manner, yet we deem their mere mention sufficient
to show that the subject under discussion is interest-
ing, important, and practical. This buing so, we
feel that our choice of a subject is a wise one, and
that time devoted to its study cannot be without profit.
CHAPTER II.
SKETCH OF THE ENGLI51 CASES.
In this sketch of the English cases we shall
select but a few of the leading ones, bein; able in
this way to treat them more in detail, and to dwell
longer upon the important points.
Harely do we find a case, especially the first
one of the series, in which the different lines of
reasoning that are to divide the highest and most
learned of the Enilish speaking courts upon the ques-
tion involved, are brought forward arid discussed.
This being so in the case of Lumley v. Gye (2 E & B
216), the case which forms the foundation of the doct-
rine it enunciated, time will. not be misspent in con-
sidering at some length the facts in the case and
the conclusions reached by the different justices.
The case was brought before the Court of queen's 3L'nch
in 1853, by Gye's demurring to Lumlcy's declaration
On the ground that the facts stated did not constitute
a anuse of action. The facts in the case were briefly
these : The plaintiff, Benjamin Lumley, was lessee
and manager of the Queen's Theater, London. In i4ovem-
bar, 1851, he entered into a written contract with
Toseph Bacher, as agent of Mlle. Johanna Wagner,
whereby the latter agreed to sing at the plaintiff's
theatre for three rmonths beginning in April, 1852.
The contract contained, among other conditions, one to
the effect that "Mil1. Wagner engages herself not to
use her talents at any other theatre, nor in any
concert or reunion, public or private, without the
written authority of '.Ir. Lumley." (Lumley v. Wagner,
1 DeG M4 & G #604). The defendant, Frederick Gys,
before the expiration of the thrte months fixed by the
contract, knowingly induced 1il1e. Wagner to break her
contract with the plaintiff, and to enter into a con-
tract with him, Gye, whereby she agreed to sing at the
Covert Garden Theatre. After procuring an injunction
against Johanna Wagner, restraining her from performing
at Covert Garden Theatre(Lumley v. Wagner 1 DeG :I & G
#04), Lumley-brinr.s this action to recover from Gye the
actual damages he sustained by the latter's malicious
interference with the plaintiff's contract, by pro-
curing Tohanna Wagner "to break her contract and not
to perform or sing at plaintiff's theatre and to
continue away during the time for which she was engaged.*
The court was called upon to decide whether or not
such facts stated a cause of action, and answered the
question in the affirmative.
ITowever, since the opinion was not unanimous and
since the majority differed to some extent as to the
reasoning upon which their decision rested, it will be
well to note briefly the opinion of each.
(1rompton, J., after stating the case as he under-
stood it says : "Whatever may have beun the origin or
foundation of the law as to enticing, of servants, and
whether it be, as contended by the plaintiff, an in-
stance and branch of a wider rule , or whether it be,
as contended by the defendant, at- anomaly and an
exception from the general rule of law on such subjects,
it ms. now be considered clear law that a person who
wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same
thing, with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting
butwoen master and servant by procuring the servant
to depart from the master's service, . . . . commits
a wrongful act, for which he is responsible at law."
After stating that the relation of master and servant
existed in this case sufficiently to apply the rule and
that he -does not however wish to be considered as say-
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ing that in no case, except that of master and servant,
is an action maintainable for maliciously inducing another
to break a contract to the injury of the person with
whom such contract has been made, he continues : "With-
out, however, deciding any such more general question,
I think that wt are justified in applying the principle
of the action for enticing away servants to a case
where the defendant maliciously procures a party, who
is under a valid contract to give her exclusive personal
service to the plaintiff for a specified period, to
refuse to give such service during the period for which
she has so contracted, whereby the plaintiff was in-
Jured."
Erle, qT., states bis opinion in broad and compre-
hansive terms, as will appear from the following : "It
is clear that the procurement of the violation of a
ri,'ht is a cause of action in all instances where the
violation is an actionable wrong. When this principle
is applied to a violation of a right arising upon a con-
tract of hiring, the nature of the service contracted
is immaterial.*
Wightman, J., gives a very exhaustive and learned
opinion. After reviewing several cases, in which an
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action upon the case was allowed, he says : "Upon the
whole, therefore, I am of opinion that, upon the gener-
al principles upon which actions upon the case are found-
ad, as well as upon authority, the present action is
maintainablh. It is not, however, necessary, for
the itaintnance of the third count of the declaration
af least, to rely upon so general a principle ; for
the case, at all events, appears to me to fall within
the cases which the defendant considers art exceptions
to the general rule, and in which actions have been
held maintainabl for procuring persons to quit the
service in which they have been rtetainc and employed.
The defendant contends that the exception is limited to
the cases of apprentices and menial servants, and
others to whom the provisions of the Statutes of
Labourers will be applicable. It appears to me, howevej
upon consideration of the cases cited upon the argument,
that the right of an employer to laintain an action on
the case for procurin-j or inducing persons in his ser-
vice to abandon their employment is not so limited ;
but that it extends to t:.L case of persons who have
contracted for personal service for a ti-e, and wnh,
during the period have been wrongfully procured and
incited to abandon such service, to the loss of the
person whom they havu contracted to serve. The right
to maintain such an action is by the common law, and
not by the Statute of Labourers, which, however, gave
a remedy, which the common law did not, in cases where
persons within the purview of the statute have voluntar-
ily left the service iY. which they were engaged, and
have been retained by another who knew of ti. ir previous
employment. The remedies and penalties given by this
and the next subsequent Statute of Labourers were
limited to the persons described in them ; but the
remedies given by the common law are not In terms
limited to any description of servant or of service."
We come next to the dissenting opinion of eoleridge,
J., in which he states the conclusions hu seeks to es-
tablish. They arc thusu : "That in respect of breach of
contract the general rule of our law is to confine its
ri-medies by action to the contractin6 parties, and
the damages directly and proximately consequential
on the act of him who is suud ; that, as between
master and servant, there is an adr.itted exception ;
that this exception dates f-om the 3tatute of Labourers,
25 Rdw. III, and both on principle and according to
authority Is-limited by it.*
We agree with the lesArned Judge in regard to the
scope of the Statute of Labourers. H1owever, we join
issue with him regarding the lines of reasoning he
pursues in the rest of his opinion. Yet w(: shall not
enter into a discussion of its merits here, but shall
state our views in a more convenient place, simply
mentioninr- in this connection that we differ from him.
As a result of the foregoing investigation, we find
that the judges were feeling their way very cautiously,
trying with their characteristic adherencu to precedents
to rest their decision upon some familiar- doctrine.
We see that two chains of reasoning were advanced.
The more conservative held that the contract was within
the principle of the Statute of Labourers, and should
be governed by it ; the others held that the right was
derived from the common law, and that the nature of the
service was immaterial.
Of course this case called forth a great deal of
comment and criticism. As a result of this when a
similar case came up for decision the court understood
more clearly the law applicable to the facts. In
1881, the next case of interest to us camt before
the Court of Appeals. It was the case of Bowen v.
Fall (6 Q 'B Div 333). The action was for knowinLly
procurin, a skilled workman, who, with a few others,
possessed a secret process for manufacturin!-, glazed
bricks, to break his contract with the plaintiff for
exclusive service for five.years. The court, realiz-
ing that the principle of the Statute of Labourers
could not be properly extended to such a case, repudia-
ted that line of reasoning, stating that they would
have much doubt as to whether they would support Lumley
v. Oye if, in order to do so, they would have to
adopt this proposition, feelingj that the dissentin,
opinion of Coleridge, J., was almost conclusive upon
that point. They, however, fully agreed with the
second chain of reasoning, and rested th.. decision of
the cast; upon it. This case put at rest forever the
question involved.
Since the court used very general language in the
case last referred to, it night be questioned whether
or not the principle they proclaimed would extend to
contracts of every description, the case before them
for determination involving a contract for personal ser-
vice only. The case of Temperton v. hussell (1893,
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1 Q B 715), the last case of importance to us, removed
all doubt in regard to this inquiry, for in that case
the doctrine was carried to its full extent. The con-
tract which the defendant knowintgly caused to be broken
was one whereby material for iunilding purposes were to
be furnished. The court followed the reasoning of
Bowen v. HTall, and treated it as settled law that one
wio knowingly induces a party to any contract to break
it commits an actionable wrong if injury results.
Another question before the court in Temperton v.
Russell was whether or not an action would lie against
one who with actual malice caused a party not to
enter into a contract with another party. The dam-
ages may be the same whother one is persuaded not to
enter into a contract, or, having enterea into it, is
induced to immediately hroak it. Yet, the grounds for
allowing an action must of necessity be different in the
two cases. Therefore we shall not treat this question,
it bein., outside of the scope of this thesis.
We sco from this review of the English authorities,
that they are in favor of allowing an action in these
cases and that they have extended the doctrine when-
ever necessary.
CHAPTER III.
SKETCH OF THE AMERICAN CASES.
We come now to the American cases, whioh are ir-
reconcilably divided ; some holding, as did Coler-
idge, J., in Lumley v. Gye, that the doctrine originated
in the Statuto of Labourers, and should uot be extended#
othrs holding, as do the Eri).ish cases generally,
that it has no such origin, and is not confined within
such narrow boundaries. In fact, some cases have aris-
en which called for the courts to extend the doctrine tO
its full extent, atid thej have responded to the call.
In the treatment of this chapter we shall, as in the one
upon the English cases, soluct t fuw of the leading
cases to show the trend of the decisions .; firsts as to
those holding with the English theory, then as to
those followin; Coleridge, J.
The case which perhaps holds the sami r. lative
position umong the American casesas does Lumley v.
Gye among the English, is Walker v. Cronin (107 M{ass
555), decided in 1871. T,)e plaintiffs stalted their
case in three counts. First, that they were manufac-
turers and sellers of boots and shoes, and employed many
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men to work for them ; that defendant, knowing these
facts induced, with the unlawful purpose of preventing
the plaintiffs fro,-- carryin';, on their bhsiness, said
poxsons to leave the eriploymont of the plaintiffs with-
out their consent and against their will, whereby
t-e plaintiffs w(-,re damaged. The second count was to
the effect that the plaintiffs had k.-itered into
contracts with a lai gu number of persons skilled in the
art of makilng hoots and shoes, whei'eby zaid persons
had, for a valuable consideration agreed to make certain
stock into boots and shoes and return the s3ime to plain-
tiffs; that df(.ndart kt.o:i;n,; all this inluc ,d said
persons to brea their contracts, whereby the plaintiffs
wcrt damuaged. In thel third coi,-It, th y sut forth
the fact that such a contract,as was described in the
second countwas cntered into by the plaintiffs, and
one Lyman L. emplef, ard that the defendan'. had induced
him to break it, whereby the i'laintiffs were injured.
.he court states in its opinion thr.l,if a contract
eiAsted by which one person had a 1(1gal right to the
further continuanct-o of the services of another, one
who knowingly and intentiotially procured it to be vio-
lated, muy be held liablh; for the wrong. The ccnrt
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continues in substance thaL the doctrine did not spring
from the Englis' Statute of Labourers, and is not con-
fined to menial service ; but is founded upon the legal
right derived from the contract, und applies to all
contracts ol umployraezit, if not to conttctn of every
description. The opinion concludes as fol,.ows : "Upon
care.ful considerution of the.. authorities as well as of
the principle involved, we are of opinion that t legal
causL of action is sufficiently stated in each of the
three counts of the declaration."
The iext casc of iraportanct. to us is U[askins v.
Royster (70 .C C01), decided in 1674. In this case
the plaintiff had employed oertuin laborcrs to work on
his farm under written contract. The defendant persuad-
ed these workmen to leave the plaintiff'< c nployment,
whereby the plaintiff was injured. The majority of
the cour-t held that an action would lie under these
circumstrinces. Rodman, J., wl}o delivcreJ the
opinion of the court proceeds az follows : "We take
it. to be a settled principle of law that if one con-
tracts upon l consideration to render personal service
to another, any third person who maliciously, that is$
without lawful justification, induces the partywho con-
tracted to render the sorvice, to rofuse to do so is
liable to the party in an action for dwrage:'."
Three years later in the same state we find before
the court for decisio the case of Jones v. Stanley
(7C T' C 3,17, in wh;ich the contract broken was not one
of persoral service. The case i dispose.! Of in a
summary rnnner, thc- jidge,delivering the opinion,
Staling that it was dccided in M.askins v. 1oystor that
if a person maliciousay, enliced laborers to break
their contracts with their eiployers and desert their
service, the employers may rccover damages a,-ainst
such person. He further states that the same reason-
ing covers every case where ont. person maliciously per-
suades aother to bre': any contrrct with ; third per-
son, it not being confined to co!tracts for service.
Time and space will riot permit of our examining any more
cases upon this side of the question. The cases al-
rcady discussed show that at least some of the courts
of this country have proceeded along the same lines
t',Pt the Enr !1ish courts in later years have followed.
In passing we 'ust also give so-ie of the cases
upon th, other side of the question. -ince there is
no ever-wideninr doctrine in these cases, but a constan t
adherence to the lirmits placed in the early c ,ses,
it will not be neces3ary to follow tTnef in clironological
order. An examincitio: of some two or three of t',e lat-
est cases will suffic.. Wo find two cases decided in
l .l at the same term of a Kentucky court, and rt-
ported in 15 S W Rep. at p 57 and at p 60. The
first, mambers v. Raldwin, was a case in whicv the
defc .,~nt induced one '.Tis. 1, break . coritractwhereby
he had agreed to sell his ther! tndivided share in a
crop of tobacco to the firm of Chambers & -Iarshali,
and to sill the same to the deferd-,rt. It was decided
tha1 these facts did not entitle the plaintiff to a
right of action. The court procteded upon the thcory
that each party to a contract "enters into it with his
eyes open, and expects to look alone to the other
for redress in case of breach by 1him. There can bel
the court continues, "but two classes of exceptions
o-u. ; such exception was made by th,, English Stat-
ute of Labourers, . . . the othor arises -; en a person
has been procured against iis will or contrary to his
purpose by coercion or deception of anoth-er to break
is contract." Th,:_n follows a discussion to the effect
that "an action legal in itself and which violates no
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right cannot be made aotionable on account of the motive
which induced it." Assuming as true what it wished to
prove, namely that the act was legal and that it vio-
lated no right, the court, of necessity, drew the con-
clusion that no action lay. 'he other Kentucky crise,
that of Eoulier v. Vncauley, was a case in which the
defendant induced the manager of '.KT'y Anderson to
break a contract with the plaintiff, whereby she was
to perform at the plaintiff's theatre, and to enter
into another contract whereby she was to perform at the
defendant's theatre. The court, applying the same
rasoin. as was applied :n the other case, of course
held no recovery. It will be seen that the facts in
this case were substantially the same as those in
aLilley v. "Iy0.
Th6 latest reported1 cast. in this, country, holding
that no right of action lies, is Boyson v. Thorn
(98 Cal b76), decided in 1893. In that case the de-
fendant maliciously persuaded one Newlands to break a
contract with the plain-iff, whereby he, '!ewlands,
had agrccd to furnish the plaintiff with rooms and
meals. The court in decidin the case stated that ac-
tions would lie in those cases in which the relation
P,5
of master and servant existed, and also in these cases
where the breach was caused by fraud, threat, and the
like. lTowever the court would not extend the doc-
trine, and as the case did not fall under either of
the above classifications, they refused to allow
tl"e plaintiff his action.
These cases are enou:h to show how irreconcilable
are thc courts ; one class assu-ies certain facts
and reaches certain results, thc other class assur-es
different premises arid draws different conclusions.
ionwever, upon the whole we think that the better reason-
ed decisions arc, in favor of allowin a remedy in
such cases.
CHAPTER IV.
THE DOCTRINE UPON PRIIC IPLE.
Prom the cases we sj.!ected for treatment in the pre-
ceding chapters, it will be soon that it is not
our purpose to enter into a discussion of those cases
in which the re]ation of master and scrvant in the
strict meaning of those terms exists; nor shall we
devote an,. time to those cases in which unlawful
means, such as threats, have been used in procuring
the broach. All agree that under such circunstances
the injureu party is ontitled to an action. Boyson
v. Thorn, 96 Cal 57- ; Chambers v. .raldwin, 15 S 7T Rep
5' ; Old D)ominion S S Co v. WcKenna, 30 i'oi 48;
Lto:' v. 2ye, 1 E & :3 216 ; Benton v. Prntt, 2 'Vend
3,. L ; ce v. Vanley, (36 !. Y 82 ; ,retes v. ,Blocker,
43 Ga 331 ; i3axbyr v. Dunlap, 22 Am Rop 475 ; Johnston
Harvester Co v. L>einhardt, 9 Abb :, C 55.3. It is to
thosc cases into which neither of these elements
enter that we shall confine oursAves, and ondeavor Lo
show that upon principle an acti:nr solild lie in such
cases.
If ,.ere are actl-al damages, of which the act of
the party canplained of is the cause, upon principles
of equity and Juistice, the inj-;red party should not
bi withou.t relief in the absence of any valid reason
for withholding it. It Is a gener,] r -le of 3an
t! at no vrong is %ithout a remedy, the exceptions
bhrinr, t>os" crses in which Justice demands a contrary
h.oJ.ing. Therefore we contend that in the case iinder
dismz~sion, an action should lie unless those xho
olppose it sho,," affirrmativel: that it should be denied.
Let us first consider the chain of reasoning fol-
lo-, cd by _dleridge, J,, in TtL'wley v. C( Ie, for if it be
correct, o,r investigation is at an end. ',e contended
that the right to recove - in such cases snrar g from
the Statute o: Labourers, and that it should not b6
oxtended beyond those cases in which the relation of
master an1 servant in the strict meaning of those terms
exists. 'Ve agree with the learned Judge that the
princil le of the 3tatute of Labourers should be so limit-
ed. owever, did the ri,:->t of aoti :n in such cases
thus originate ? The state of societr in Zn;-land at
the time of the passage of this statute made its
enactment imperative. i':nglend had been visited by
pestilence, known in history as the Yi"ack DeathT,, which
resulted in the laborin, class being greatly redtced
In number. So much so that the demand for laborers
was great enough to admit of their demanding unusually
high wages. If this demand was refused, they travel-
ed from place to place, feeling sure of getting employ-
sent elsewhere. This resulted in many places being
neglected for want of workmen. To remedy this"'state
of affairs, the statute was passed. It said nothing
about directly inducing a cohtract to be broken. In
fact, this was not the evil aimed at.' 'It was enacted
to compel laborers to specifically perform their con-
tracts, and to accomplish this it made it a wrong, ' l
for one to employ a laborer if he knew that the laborer
was bound to serve another.
Let us see ifl we can discover any reason for the
courts' placing any stress upon thi3 doctrine in the
early cases. It will be remembered that the first '
case, Lumley v. Gye, to call for Judicial decision ';:
was one in which the relation of master and servant ex-
isted, although not in The strict irteaulng of those
terms. The defendant er'!loyod Johonna aigzer, knoWing
that she was bound to sa;*ve another. Was it strange,
then, that the English Judges ;ith their charatoristio
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conservatism and love of precedents, should have leaned
towards extending a well known doctrine to this case,
although a different kind of action was brought 9 It
will be remembered that they were not, however, complete-
I,, satisfied with this reasoning, and each, with the
exception of Qoleridgo, J., stated in different degrees
of boldness that the case might be decided upon other
grounds, and be extended to contracts other than those
in which the relation of master and servant existed.'
While they knew t hat the nature of the service to be
rendered affected the right to recover for enticing
away a servant, they seemed to also see that in the
day of com ,lete labor emancipation all contracts would
be entered into in the same manner, master and servant
contracting upon a legal equality, and thoft under such
c trci;nstances the nature of the service to be, rendered
would be no criterion by which to judge as to a right
of action for causing a breach of contract. Lish Dir
& F Sec 303 ; Temperton v. Russel, 1893, 1 f) B 718.
-gui 3 S Co v. ?McGregor, lh92 A C 25 ; T'lker v.
Cronin, 107 !Ja.s .556.
We feel that the reasoning by which a right to rc-
cover for causing a breach of contract is said to be
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founded upon the Statute of Labourers and to be limited
to contracts of personal service is Incorrect. If a
right is to be allowed it must be upon different grounds.
Afi r a close study of the question we haveconcluded
that the right to recover is founded on common law (L',m-
icy v. Oye 2 E & B p 241), is derived from the contract
itself. (Walker v. Cronin, 107 ass p 567), add is not
limited to those contracts in which the relation of
master and servant exists. Temiperton v. Russe'll, 1893,
I Q B 715 ; Jones v. Stanley, 76 N C 355 ; fish non-
Cont Law Sec 495. In Temperton v. Fussell, the court
states the following : "The contract confers hdrtain
rights on the person with whom it is made, and not
only binds the parties to it by the obliga ,ons entered
into ; but also imposes on all thy world the
duty to respect the contractual obligation". (Temperton
v. Russell, 193, I Q B p 730). Lawson, in his work on
contracts, states the principle thus : "But though a
contract cannot impose the burdens of an obligation
upon one who is not a party to it, nevertheless a
contract does impose a duty, upon person oxtraneous
to the obligation, not to interferc with its due
performance.* (Lawson on Cont e3oc 115).
It is said that to so hold would be to destroy
competition by protecting certain persons against it,
and that such should not be. We grant thaL one has
no right to be p-otected against competition and that
if disturbance or 1oss comes as a resualt o. competition
it is damnum absque injuria. (Lucke v. Clothing etc.
Assemb 26 At Rep 505 ; Dudley v. Briggs, 141 Mass
b82). However, if a valid contract exists, competition
in respect to the subject matter of such contract hag
coased, and a right has come into existence, the
interference with which the law will not permtit. In
ether words, every one has an equal right to employ
workmen in his business, yet, if a contract exists
whereby some other person is entitled to the further
continuance of the sernvice of suc.f workman, one who
knowingly procures it to be violated ma,, be held liable
altho- gh he did it for the jiurpose of promoting: his.
own business. (!alker v. Croniin 10Y Mass p 563).
ilowever the iinjure(i party has riot an absolute
right, knowledge of which the world must have at Its
peril, and the interfeiricc with which eititles him
to at least nominal damages. On the contrary, to
make out a case, he must show that the def1 ndant knowing-
ly caused a breach of the contract, that the defend-
ant's act was the proximate cause of the breach, and
that the breach resulted in actual damages. (Bligelow
on Torts p 141 ; Pollock on Torts, p 352 ; A':ish Dir & F
See 303, Seec 371).
The only one of these factors which calls for a
discussion is the one in regard to proximate causc,
for, unles it is shown that the defendant had knowl-
edge of the contract and that its breach resulted
in actual damages, wt. agree that no action lies.
It is said by some that the defendant's acts cannot be
the proximate cause of the breach in such ca:es,
the act of a free agent, namely, the one breaking the
contract, having intervened. Are we to say that one
is to escape the consequences of his acts because he
accomplished it through the instrumentality of a third
party ? Or are we to consider those results proxi-
rqate which ht not only saw were likely to follow from
his acts, but which he actually strove to produce ?
A statement of these questions must inevitably suggest
the correct answer, yet wc shall look at some of the
authorities. Pollock defines proximatu cause as
follows : N Those consequences, and those only,
are deemed proxim&te, which a person of average com-
petence and knowledge, bein,; in the like case with the
person whose conduct is complained of, and having the
like opportunity of observation, might be expected to
foresee as likely to follow upon such conduct.,
(Pollock on Torts #28). Again Pollock says in sub-
stance that one cannot say that the result is not prox-
imate to his act because some act of another party
has intervened, if he saw that the result would
happen. (Pollock on Torts #453-4). We shall not
devote more time to this except to cite the following
authorities : Scott v. Shepherd 2 Wt. Blackst Rep
892 ; *lwaukee &c R R Co v. Kellogg, 94 U S 469.
There is one more point upon which we must touch.
It is said that when two parties enter into a contract
they rely upon each other to fulfill the terms of the
same, and expect upon the failure so to do to look to
the one breaking the contract for redress and to no
other. The advocates of this theory fail to consider
the fact that the parties to a contract do not expect
interferunce from outside parties, hence feel that if
the contract is not carried out the failure will be
due wholly to the act of a contracting party. If they
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were to foresee that some wealthy individual, some strong
labor union, would interfere with the due performance
of their contract, it is reasonable to prophesy that
they would not enter into contracts as freely as they
do, unless they felt that the courts would not allow
this wrongful interference to go unheeded, this injury
to be without a remedy. Because the parties did not
foresee the interference, hence, did not expect the
remedy, seems a poor reason for withholding the
remedy.
These are the several reasons advanced for hold-
ing that no action should lie, and w. have attempted
to show the fallacies in the reasoning of those who ad-
vocate them. If w(; have succeeded in this, an
action should lie, since they have failed to show
that this Is an excerption to the rule that no wrong
is without a remedy, and the burden of proof was
upon them. After a careful study of the question, we
are convinced that the weight of authority is in favor
of allowing the action and that principles of justice
and equity demand a redress for this injury, a remedy
for this wrong.
